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NEW CHALLENGES TO TRANSBOUNDARY UNITIZATION IN THE
GULF OF MEXICO
By: Isaac Olson†
ABSTRACT
In the last two decades, the search for untapped oil reserves led to
many innovations in oil and gas exploration. As new technology
continues to open new horizons, oil companies are increasingly able
to drill at deeper ocean depths to tap offshore reserves. Offshore
drilling poses problems where oil reserves hundreds of miles from
shore cross an international boundary line. While American courts
typically apply the rule of capture to determine who owns the subsoil
resources, international law requires countries to work together to
maximize the efficient, safe extraction of the resources. In 2012, the
United States and Mexico drafted a treaty that would govern the
unitization of an offshore transboundary oil field. Today, Mexico’s
energy laws are very different. A new administration threatens to
unravel recent liberal reforms, and the United States has become more
hostile to Chinese investment in the region. With these political
challenges in mind, the treaty is very vague on critical issues,
particularly its dispute resolution clause, which the United States and
Mexico must strengthen if the treaty is to be effective and shared
transboundary resources develop efficiently to the benefit of both
nations. The treaty creates a body called the Joint Commission to
create much of the treaty’s policy and procedure. In order to maintain
good relations and a healthy energy sector, the Joint Commission
needs to create subsidiary committees subject to its control and
comprised of various experts to ensure the treaty is implemented
impartially.
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Et quidem naturali iure communia sunt omnium haec: aer et aqua
profluens et mare et per hoc litora maris.1
—Justinian I
I. INTRODUCTION
Roman law regarded the sea as the property of all mankind for all
to pass through uninhibited according to Natural Law.2 Disputes over
trade, the Declaration of Pope Alexander, and Portuguese claims to
sovereignty over maritime trade routes led Hugo Grotius to argue from
Natural Law that it is impossible to make the sea property, and
therefore it should be shared by all nations.3 However, by the early
modern era, coastal states asserted territorial sovereignty over three
miles from the shore—because this is how far the average cannonball
from a sea-fort would reach.4 This projection of force was the only
1. J. INST. 2.1.1. (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans., Cornell Univ. Press 4th
prtg. 1996) (“The things which are naturally everybody’s are: air, flowing water, the
sea, and the sea-shore.”).
2. William T. Abel, Fishing for an International Norm to Govern Straddling
Stocks: The Canada-Spain Dispute of 1995, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 553,
556 (1996).
3.HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIERUM 47 (Ralph van Deman Magoffin trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1916) (1608) (“For it is impossible to acquire by usucaption or
prescription things which cannot become property, that is, which are not susceptible
of possession or of quasi-possession, and which cannot be alienated. All of which is
true with respect to the sea and its use.”), available at
https://books.google.com/books/about/Mare_liberum.html?id=7SkRAAAAYAAJ
&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false.
4. ERNEST E. SMITH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS 106
(3d ed. 2010).
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way to assert dominion over the waters, and thus the sea was regarded
as common property.
As the technology to extract more resources from the world’s
oceans developed in the 20th century, states began to claim more
sovereignty over the oceans to preserve their interest in subsoil
resources.5 In 1945, President Truman, through federal proclamation,
claimed the exclusive federal right to all subsoil resources of the
continental shelf adjacent to the territorial sea.6 Not wanting to be left
out, coastal nations began to claim the continental shelf and all
resources therein, leading to maritime boundary disputes the
International Community had to settle throughout subsequent
decades.7
Today, nations with an ocean coastline have different levels of legal
jurisdictions within their sovereignty.8 Most legal authority
establishing the law of the sea comes from the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).9 Ratified by most
nations, the United States never ratified the convention but has
recognized most of it as customary international law.10 The convention
established jurisdictions including a twelve-mile territorial sea,
twenty-four miles of contiguous sea, the 200-mile Exclusive
Economic Zone (“EEZ”), and the Continental Shelf.11 The modern
law of the sea gives all nations the freedom to travel the high seas,
including the territorial sea but reserves different rights to ocean and
seabed resources in different regions.12
Under UNCLOS, states have sovereign rights to all resources in the
200 mile EEZ, including subsoil resources.13 Where the continental
shelf extends past the EEZ, States can claim up to 350 miles,
depending on geological features, and assert sovereignty over subsoil
resources in this zone.14 UNCLOS leaves the limitation of boundaries
5. Id. at 106–07.
6. Id. at 107 (quoting Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Oct. 2,
1945)).
7. Md. Monjour Hasan et al., Protracted Maritime Boundary Disputes and
Maritime Laws, 2 J. INT’L MAR. SAFETY, ENVTL. AFF., & SHIPPING 89, 89 (2018).
8. Richard J. McLaughlin & Kateryna M. Wowk, Managing Areas Beyond
National Jurisdiction in the Gulf of Mexico: Current and Developing International
Legal Authority and Future Challenges, 9.2 SEA GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 16, 20 (2018).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Henry Jones, Lines in the Ocean: Thinking with the Sea About Territory and
International Law, 4 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 307, 334–35 (2016).
13. McLaughlin & Wowk, supra note 9, at 21.
14. Id.
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on the continental shelf up to the coastal nations themselves.15 Many
of these maritime borders are still contested with sovereigns unable to
agree on many maritime boundaries for various legal, geographical,
and geopolitical reasons.16 The United States and Mexico delineated
the boundary of the Western half of the Gulf of Mexico (“GOM”) in a
2000 treaty.17
Oil is a fugitive resource—it flows like water under the ground and
lies pooled in rocks where Nature or Nature’s God has deposited it
irrespective of the boundaries mankind places on the surface of the
earth. This can be especially problematic when drilling in deepwater—
deeper than 4,000 feet—or ultra-deepwater—deeper than 7,000 feet
because of the high cost of drilling at such depths.18 The United States
has generally applied the rule of capture to oil and gas production on
land. The rule of capture states that regardless of whose land the oil
reservoir may also be under, the first in time to drill and extract the oil
owns the oil.19 Thus, on land, it is perfectly legal to extract oil that lies
under someone else’s property lines because the first in time to drill
can legally siphon off the oil from the pool.20
Few other nations follow the rule of capture on land and have
favored a legal process called “unitization” for offshore oil and gas
reservoirs, which lay on both sides of a maritime boundary.21
Unitization is a standard method sovereigns use to efficiently share
offshore resources.22 Unitization is the process of treating the reservoir
as one unit, as if owned and operated by a single entity, to facilitate
the most efficient means of extraction.23 The unitization of a
transboundary reservoir usually requires a treaty between the nations

15. Id. at 35.
16. For a list of main disputed areas, see Nicholas Newman, Maritime Boundary
Disputes, ENIDAY https://www.eniday.com/en/human_en/maritime-boundarydisputes/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
17. Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez & Richard J. McLaughlin, The 2012 Agreement
on the Exploitation of Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resources in the Gulf of
Mexico: Confirmation of the Rule or Emergence of a New Practice?, 37 HOUS. J.
INT’L L. 681, 740 (2015).
18. Jason Lavis, Shallow, mid to ultra deepwater definitions, DRILLERS (Apr. 6,
2018) https://drillers.com/shallow-mid-to-ultra-deepwater-definitions/.
19. Youri van Logchem, The Status of a Rule of Capture under International
Law of the Sea with Regard to Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Related Activities, 26
MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 195, 201 (2018).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 217.
22. Id. at 218–219.
23. SMITH ET AL., supra note 4, at 167.
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the reservoir crosses so that the nations can govern the unitized area
with one legal, tax, regulatory, and production scheme.24
Unitization is not uncommon in offshore oil and gas production
because the square leasing blocks are imposed over the ocean. The
United States and Mexico divide the GOM into square blocks for
leasing to companies who explore for oil and gas reserves.25 However,
subsoil reservoirs never conform to the blocks with geometric
precision and can cross the blocks within one country’s jurisdiction.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE 2012 TREATY
A. Mexico’s Pre-Reform Hydrocarbon Regime
In 1938, Mexico was the first country to nationalize the entire oil
and gas sector.26 Before President Lázaro Cárdenas expropriated all
foreign assets, the Mexican Constitution of 1917 had already reserved
the ownership of subsoil hydrocarbons to the government.27 The
International Oil Companies (“IOCs”) issued an embargo against
Mexican oil in the international market, forcing Mexico to sell its oil
to Nazi Germany.28 While some United States officials urged dealing
harshly with Mexico, President Roosevelt found it more important to
maintain a good relationship with Mexico to prevent a possible
alliance with the Axis Powers.29 Eventually, the Mexican Government
compensated several American IOCs for the expropriations, but
Mexico’s state-owned oil company, Petróleos Mexicanos
(“PEMEX”), retained its monopoly.
Eventually, PEMEX could not conduct the exploration needed to
continue producing oil at sustainable rates.30 The Mexican
24. Id.
25. For leases on the US side of the gulf, see Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management
Gulf
of
Mexico
Protraction
Finder,
http://www.arcgis.com/apps/View/index.html?appid=a20b30b37ae147a59afac8a8
4a2d4052&extent=-99.8775,22.3323,-78.7838,32.3452. Note the green lease
squares abutting the maritime border in the “Alaminos Canyon” leasing region. For
the Mexican side, see https://portal.cnih.cnh.gob.mx/iicnih2/.
26. Office of the Historian, Mexican Expropriation of Foreign Oil, 1938, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/mexican-oil (last
visited Feb. 2, 2019).
27. Richard H.K. Vietor & Haviland Sheldahl-Thomason, Mexico’s Energy
Reform, HARV. BUS. SCH. CASE 717-027, January 2017. (Revised August 2017.) 1..
28. Office of the Historian, Mexican Expropriation of Foreign Oil, 1938, U.S.
DEP’T OF ST. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/mexican-oil (last
visited Feb. 2, 2019).
29. Id.
30. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 684.
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Government utilized PEMEX’s profits through heavy taxes and
provided about one-third of the government’s income by taxing its
income at 69%.31 By 2015, production in the once massive Cantarell
field had fallen by 80%, labor unions were extracting hefty profits, and
PEMEX continued to maximize the volume of oil produced instead of
the number of wells, leaving PEMEX short of cash to explore for new
fields.32
Meanwhile, IOCs developed the technology for extracting oil from
ultra-deepwater reservoirs. As they expanded deeper into the Gulf of
Mexico, the Mexican government grew concerned about a reservoir
straddling both borders siphoning off oil from Mexican Territory,
prompting national debate and pressure to create a treaty with the
United States.33 Mexico’s hydrocarbon law gave PEMEX exclusive
rights to explore and produce oil, yet PEMEX lacked the resources
and technology to exploit these deepwater reservoirs because their
profits were funding government revenue instead of reinvesting in
exploration and production.34 PEMEX’s favored position posed a
unique problem because they could neither legally nor financially
undertake a joint venture in these ultra-deepwater fields. Additionally,
PEMEX’s oil production declined, compounding the problem and
making the need for unconventional and deepwater exploration even
more vital for Mexico’s oil and gas industry to sustain itself.35
In 2012, United States and Mexican officials met to plan for
deepwater exploration’s expansion into the transboundary region of
the GOM. The 2012 treaty they created was designed to work around
the PEMEX monopoly while maintaining sovereignty over natural
resources.36 However, the United States failed to ratify it for nearly
two years because it was caught up in political controversy.37 By 2014,
once it became clear that Mexico would pass energy reforms

31. Vietor & Sheldahl-Thomason, supra note 28, at 2.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18 at 686, 689–690.
34. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, art. 27, para. 1,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 1967; Javier Martínez-Romero, Ph.D.,
Innovation as an Imperative for the Mexican Oil Industry Post Energy Reform,
JAMES A. BAKER III INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y, April 2017, at 1, 2.
35. Sanchez & Mclaughlin, supra note 18 at 684.
36. Id. at 791.
37. At the time there were tensions with IOC’s because of some Dodd-Frank
restrictions, see SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, 112TH CONG., OIL, MEXICO, AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY AGREEMENT
9, 15 (S. Print 2012); Sanchez & Mclaughlin, supra note 17 at 751.
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liberalizing the oil monopoly by a complex constitutional amendment,
the United States Senate ratified the treaty.38
The United States recognized that the trend in Mexico’s
hydrocarbon regime was towards reform, yet was skeptical of the
stability of the transition.39 The United States was chiefly concerned
with supporting anything that promoted IOC’s willingness to invest in
Mexican oil as the industry opened up.40 Economically, the United
States recognized that Mexico supports United States energy security
by being a reliable and friendly producer of oil in the region.41
Geopolitically, strengthening Mexico’s hydrocarbon sector was
important because unconventional resources in the United States and
Canada as well as Mexico’s untapped reserves were an important
energy security issue.42 The United States Senate saw these new North
American oil resources as a way to undermine the power of hostile
authoritarian regimes reliant on hydrocarbons for funding, like
Venezuela and Russia.43 The treaty incorporates these reasons but
overall was meant to reduce legal uncertainty in the transboundary
region to encourage IOC investment.
The 2012 treaty establishes a procedure for any exploration within
three miles of the maritime boundary in the GOM.44 It requires
licensees on either side to share geological information in this area
annually and to provide written notice within sixty days of becoming
aware of the “likely existence” of a transboundary reservoir.45 Once
triggered, the parties have thirty days to initiate an investigation, and
if the parties cannot determine whether a transboundary reservoir
exists within sixty days, they must alert the Joint Commission.46 The
Joint Commission is created by the United States and Mexico,
consisting of one representative (and one alternate representative)
from each party, chosen by the Executive Agency of each party.47 The
Joint Commission is supposed to examine disputes, interpret the
38. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 748.
39. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 38, at 2–3.
40. Id. at 6.
41. Id. at 11.
42. Id. at 12–13.
43. Id.
44. Agreement between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States
Concerning
Transboundary
Hydrocarbon
Reservoirs
in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S.-Mex., art. 4 §1, Feb. 20, 2012, T.I.A.S. 14-0718
(hereinafter “2012 Transboundary Treaty”).
45. Id. at art 4. §2(a), (c).
46. Id. at art. 5 §§ 1–2.
47. Id. at art. 14 §2.
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treaty, implement terms, and set rules of procedure.48 The Joint
Commission may submit disputes, such as the existence of a
transboundary reservoir, to an expert determination; initiate dispute
resolution clause; or send the matter to non-binding mediation or
arbitration.49 The Joint Commission must also establish the rules and
procedure of arbitration.50
B. Ratification and Energy Reform
1. Relevance of the Treaty Post-Reform
Deepwater and ultra-deepwater oil production is incredibly costly.
The United States Energy Information Agency estimated that one
deepwater project by Chevron in the GOM took nine years to go from
discovery to production and cost $91 million per well, including a
$258 million pipeline.51 It takes an average of five drilling attempts
before finding an economically productive hydrocarbon reserve.52 Oil
companies want national offshore boundaries negotiated in a way that
minimizes their investment risk because of the extremely high capital
costs.
Mexico and the United States negotiated the 2012 treaty before
Mexico’s historic energy reforms when a joint venture was not legal.53
Since then, Mexico has granted licenses to foreign investors for
deepwater exploration, creating unique complications for
implementing the treaty. When the United States and Mexico ratified
the treaty, IOCs in the United States side were already producing
within the three-mile zone, meaning the oil reservoir could straddle
the boundary.54 However, the United States exempted itself from
retroactive enforcement of these wells in the treaty.55 Many of these
operators were not grandfathered into the treaty, as the United States

48. Id. at art. 14 §§ 4–5.
49. Id. at art. 14 §8.
50. Id. at art. 17.
51. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Trends in U.S. Oil and Natural
Gas Upstream Costs 108–109, US DEP’T OF ENERGY (Mar. 2016),
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/drilling/pdf/upstream.pdf.
52. Will
Kenton,
Exploratory
Well,
INVESTOPEDIA
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/exploratory-well.asp (last updated June 25,
2019).
53. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 748.
54. Id. at 740.
55. Id. at 746–47.
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did not force their licensees to modify their contracts to conform with
the 2012 treaty.56
For example, the Perdido fold belt is a long geologic feature in the
GOM consisting of a series of subterranean anticline formations
found to contain oil on both sides of the maritime border.57 In the
Perdido region, IOCs are already producing within a few miles of the
maritime border, while Mexico has awarded an exploration license to
a Chinese government owned company on their side of the GOM.58 It
is possible that some of the wells on the United States side in Perdido
straddle transboundary reserves, yet the licensees are under no treaty
obligation to determine the boundaries.59 To date, neither side has
attempted to determine whether a transboundary reservoir exists,
which would trigger the treaty’s implementation.
If the licensee that discovers a transboundary reservoir in their
concession is a National Oil Company (“NOC”) like Sinopec or the
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (“CNOOC”), it would
essentially invite a third government into the unitization
negotiations.60 The government involved would learn a great deal
about effectively negotiating transboundary contracts. Additionally,
United States foreign policy has recently been more suspicious of
Chinese investment in the United States’ immediate sphere of
influence.61
The 2013 reforms have allowed private companies to make joint
production, profit sharing, licenses, and service contracts.62 However,
56. Id.
57. Javier H. Estrada, Reservoirs that Cross Country Lines Need Special
Agreements, OFFSHORE MAG. (July 1, 2009), https://www.offshoremag.com/articles/print/volume-69/issue-7/latin-america/reservoirs-that-cross.html.
58. Kristy Hays, UPDATE 1-Shell Starts Production at Perdido, REUTERS (Mar.
31, 2010, 5:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/shell-perdido/update-1-shellstarts-production-at-perdido-idUSN3123683920100331; Shell Picks Up Nine
Blocks in Mexico Offshore Lease Round, MAR. EXECUTIVE ( Jan. 31, 2018, 7:44
PM), https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/shell-picks-up-nine-blocks-inmexico-offshore-lease-round; Matt Zborowski, BHP, CNOOC, European Majors
Among Winners for Mexican Deepwater Blocks, OIL & GAS J. (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://www.ogj.com/articles/2016/12/bhp-cnooc-european-majors-amongwinners-for-mexican-deepwater-blocks.html.
59. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 685.
60. See generally Jilles van den Beukel, Chinese National Oil Companies:
Giants Built on Shaky Foundations, ENERGYPOST (Sept. 26, 2016),
https://energypost.eu/chinese-national-oil-companies-giants-built-shakyfoundations/.
61. See Robert D. Kaplan, A New Cold War Has Begun, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 7,
2019, 6:27 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/a-new-cold-war-has-begun/.
62. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 758.
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transboundary fields require at least 20% participation with PEMEX,
which further complicates negotiating the terms in a unitization
agreement.63 In light of the Mexican energy reforms and foreign
investment, it is unclear how relevant the treaty remains. If it is not
relevant, it is still a binding treaty. In either case, states must clarify
certain ambiguities in the treaty language for it to accomplish its goals
effectively.
2. Ambiguities and Their Political Impact
The 2012 treaty requires the United States and Mexico to share all
information obtained during exploration within three miles of the
delimitation line.64 It requires a party aware of “the likely existence”
of a transboundary reservoir to provide written notice and share
seismic data.65 International law generally requires a standard of good
faith to interpret treaty language which is necessarily vague, such as
“likely existence.”66 The interpretation could be complicated when
the parties of the treaty are two sovereign nations and the licensees
exploring for oil reservoirs are IOCs and foreign state-owned
companies.
The capital risks and the high cost of obtaining reliable seismic data
provide some incentive to interpret the data in a way that shows
transboundary reservoirs do not exist. On the other hand, for Mexico,
which lacks infrastructure, investment, and capital, there is an
incentive to interpret seismic date liberally to provide for a
transboundary reservoir. Some voices in Mexican politics believe that
oil companies on the United States side of the maritime border are
extracting from transboundary reservoirs, but this is not confirmed.67
No language specifies when economic efficiency should yield to
environmental concerns or State interests.68 The United States Senate,
while urging the treaty’s ratification, tacitly acknowledged that the
“plain language” failed to improve environmental safety standards
and could even lower existing standards.69 The Senate committee was
concerned that this would result in lower standards by delegating
63. Id. at 759.
64. 2012 Transboundary Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 4, § 1.
65. Id. at art. 4, § 2(a)–(b).
66. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 336; 2012 Transboundary Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 4, § 2.
67. Sanchez & Mclaughlin, supra note 18 at 686.
68. Id. at 753.
69. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 38, at 9–10.
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authority to the appropriate executive appointee to define the
standards.70 Environmental safety standards became increasingly
important after the high profile oil spill by British Petroleum in
2010.71
The ambiguities in the treaty are problematic because Mexico
considers these resources property of the State for the benefit of the
nation, while the United States sees oil production as a national
security issue, necessitating that private companies exploit the
resources efficiently.72 These interests are not directly in conflict, but
different situations could lead the parties to desire different outcomes.
Mexico’s nationalistic approach makes them less willing to see
profits flow out of Mexico, while the United States’s view of oil as a
national security issue desires resource development that stabilizes
the Mexican nation and economy concerning their place in the global
marketplace.
In the United States view, foreign investment in Mexico’s energy
sector contributes to political stability in Mexico. Political instability
leading to upheaval or investment by hostile foreign powers are
important concerns. Chinese NOC investment in Mexican offshore
oil potentially allows Chinese geopolitical influence in the Gulf of
Mexico and may lead the United States to be less charitable in
negotiating a unitization contract.73 The United States is pressuring
nations in Central America to avoid business ties with Chinese stateowned corporations.74 The United States’s economic tensions with
Chinese investors could easily lead to a dispute about the terms of
unitization while implementing the treaty.

70. Specifically, the Secretary of the Interior, Id. at 10.
71. Terese Collins, The Gulf Oil Spill, SMITHSONIAN (April 2018),
https://ocean.si.edu/conservation/pollution/gulf-oil-spill.
72. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 754.
73. Compare to Chinese investment in Venezuela and the US response, Antonio
C. Hsiang, China and the Venezuela Crisis, DIPLOMAT (July 24, 2017),
https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/china-and-the-venezuela-crisis/. For a more
detailed look at Chinese investment in Venezuela in the context of Chinese
geopolitical ambitions, with a recommendation for a hard stance from the US, see
Moises Rendon, When Investment Hurts: Chinese Influence in Venezuela, CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (April 3, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/wheninvestment-hurts-chinese-influence-venezuela
74. Edward Wong, Mike Pompeo Warns Panama Against Doing Business With
China,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
19
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/world/americas/mike-pompeo-panamachina.html?module=inline.
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III. POTENTIAL DISPUTES & RESOLUTION
A. The Rule of Capture and International Law
Mexico’s concern is that if a United States licensee invokes the rule
of capture in a transboundary reservoir, it will effectively steal
resources the government owns, and they will lose profits and rents
they deserve. International law generally rejects the rule of capture in
favor of good faith requirements of dealing between sovereigns.75
Additionally, most governments agree that applying the rule of capture
is not in their best interest, as it leads to competitive drilling,
inaccessible resources, and inefficiency.76 Avoiding competitive
drilling is a significant state goal when negotiating transboundary
agreements because both sides typically lose by not extracting the oil
as efficiently.77 Oil and gas reserves are fugitive resources that will
travel from their location to the well or place of extraction.78 Several
nations have reached agreements for joint development or unitization
that reject the rule of capture and this possibly establishes a rejection
of the rule of capture according to customary international law.79
In addition to customary international law, UNCLOS articles 74(3),
84(3), and two United Nations Assembly Resolutions also support the
position that cooperative development of offshore transboundary
reserves is the international standard.80 Supporting the theory that
international law bars competitive drilling, the International Court of
Justice (“ICJ”) decided that states are obliged to behave as good
neighbors (sic utere tuo, ut alienum non leaedas) as a rule of
customary international law.81 However, these laws are not definitive,
and a dispute over transboundary reserves is what Saddam Hussein
alleged justified his invasion of Kuwait.82 Applied to oil and gas
reserves, the rule of capture would cause a loss of these resources to
one nation, and such an action by one state against another state’s
claims and sovereign rights is likely to cause an international
confrontation.83
75. van Logchem, supra note 20, at 203.
76. Id.
77. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18.
78. van Logchem, supra note 20, at 198.
79. SMITH ET AL., supra note 5, at 166.
80. Id. at 166–167.
81. See North Sea Continental Shelf, (Ger./Den; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969
I.C.J Rep. 3, ¶ 19 (Feb. 20) cited in van Logchem, supra note 20.
82. SMITH ET AL., supra note 5, at 167.
83. van Logchem, supra note 20, at 219–220.
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However, even before the treaty, some scholars pointed out the
inevitability of an operator applying the rule of capture. Professor
Grunstein highlighted that if a licensee who has invested 500 million
dollars in exploration discovers a transboundary reservoir, they are not
going to stop production while the United States and Mexico negotiate
the unitization details according to the treaty.84 Additionally, some
states have taken actions that seem to invoke the rule of capture over
subsoil resources in a disputed maritime border. Ghana caused an
international incident when Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire were waiting for
a ruling over a disputed maritime area, and Ghana began moving
infrastructure as if they were still planning on producing the
resources.85 Arguably, exploration activity, like seismic surveys and
exploratory wells in a disputed area, can violate the international law
principle against aggravating a dispute.86 Commencing drilling in a
transboundary region comes with serious consequences and is based
on dubious legal grounds.
PEMEX is supposed to participate in any offshore transboundary
reservoirs, but it could take years before PEMEX has the resources to
contribute more than cash to deepwater hydrocarbon production.87
IOCs will be less likely to explore for oil in the area if there is a chance
they have to delay production so that the United States and Mexico
can figure out how to incorporate PEMEX into their unitization
agreement. Several scholars proposed to solve this problem by putting
the proportion of funds due to Mexico into an escrow fund until the
treaty details have been sorted out.88 University of Dundee Professor
Peter Cameron first advocated this approach as a solution that would
allow drilling to continue promptly without invoking the rule of
capture.89
This approach could lead to drilling before the licensees find the
best spot to drill, and customary international law on this topic remains
scarce.90 However, it resolves many problems by preventing a halt of
production while the treaty details are sorted out. Escrow would be a
84. Miriam Grunstein, Unitized we Stand, Divided we Fall: A Mexican Response
to Karla Urdaneta’s Analysis of Transboundary Petroleum Reservoirs in the Deep
Waters of the Gulf of Mexico, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 345, 364 (2011).
85. van Logchem, supra note 20, at 204.
86. Id. at 205–206.
87. Grunstein, supra note 85, at 358.
88. This approach is advocated by Professors Sanchez, McLaughlin, and
Cameron. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18 at 708.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 709.
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fairer option for the governments on both sides, while the licensees
will likely object because they potentially lose opportunity costs when
oil profits are locked in escrow instead of in their cash flow while
various parties debate unitization. Once again, the problem comes
from the parties’ misaligned interests. The United States and Mexico
want to ensure they are not losing out on natural resource revenue over
time, while an IOC that has invested 500 million dollars over the better
part of a decade wants to start seeing a return on their investment. As
the interests of United States and Mexico are greater than IOC
revenue, IOC cash flows will probably need to temporarily yield to
soveriegn perogatives by sending profits into escrow in order to
preserve peace and allow production to continue.
The escrow solution, while applying international law principles of
equity, good faith, and fair dealing, is complicated in several
situations. Because of the complexities of determining whether a
transboundary field exists, wells may already be producing from
transboundary fields.91 The United States awards blocks to oil
companies for exploration in the GOM roughly nine square miles in
size.92 The Neptune Field, a deepwater field 120 miles from Louisiana,
spans five of these nine square mile blocks.93 Thus, it is entirely
possible that there are unknown deepwater and ultra-deepwater
reservoirs that lessees may discover outside the three-mile reporting
zone required by the treaty, which could still cross the boundary.94 If
a licensee discovers a transboundary reservoir, and the American side
has been producing for several years already, the escrow option will
probably be reasonable to apply, but the treaty does not explicitly
provide for the contingency, making the transaction ripe for conflict.
B. Points of Contention
Of course, no parties plan on an unresolvable dispute while
negotiating unitization. The 2012 treaty leaves dispute resolution
fairly vague, establishing expert determination, non-binding
mediation, and arbitration in different situations.95 The Joint
Commission is supposed to establish the procedure and mechanism
91. Id. at 685.
92. Glossary,
BUREAU OF SAFETY & ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.bsee.gov/newsroom/library/glossary (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
93. Neptune Field, Gulf of Mexico, OFFSHORE TECH. https://www.offshoretechnology.com/projects/neptune-field/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
94. 2012 Transboundary Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 4 §2(f).
95. 2012 Transboundary Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 15.
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for arbitration.96 The Joint Commission consists of two members (and
two alternates) appointed by each nation’s executive agency.97 Two
political appointees are unlikely able to create a satisfactory arbitration
regime for a high-stakes international business deal like a unitization
agreement. Transboundary unitization contracts are incredibly
complex, multiplying the opportunity for disputes to arise.
A significant point of contention could conceivably be designating
the unit operator. The 2012 treaty states that the Executive Agencies
will pick the unit operator “by agreement between the licensees.”98
Designating the unit operator could become extremely complicated.
For example, suppose a Chinese licensee on the Mexican side
discovers they have been unknowingly producing from a
transboundary reservoir for several years and two different IOCs were
producing from the same reservoir on the United States side. In a joint
operating agreement, the operator is usually the party with the greatest
interest in the venture.99 Mexico requires offshore licensees to accept
PEMEX’s participation in an agreement by at least 20%,100 adding
fourth potential operator. Mexico may want their Chinese licensee to
be operator because of their view of oil as a national asset, even though
the IOCs clearly had a greater interest. The Joint Commission would
send proportionality and other issues to expert determination while
negotiating the unitization agreement.101 The Joint Commission could
handle these contingencies if it could be strengthened to provide
expertise and transparency to ensure adaptability.
IV. FUTURE CONCERNS
A. Strengthening the Joint Commission
The treaty ultimately needs amendment or revision now that
Mexico has opened to private investment. The parties could either
completely terminate the treaty or amend it. Termination merely

96. Id. at art. 17.
97. Id. at art. 14 §2.
98. Id. at art 10 §1.
99. SMITH ET AL., supra note 5, at 542..
100. Analysis of Mexico’s New Hydrocarbons Legal Regime, MAYER BROWN 6
(Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/69fe7acd-ca5b4d1c-a172-31678b13ec06/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/75b0fe83-d4a24523-b8e2-3f7ae78102a7/UPDATE-Analysis-of-Mexicos-New-HydrocarbonsLegal-Regime.pdf.
101. 2012 Transboundary Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 14 §§6–8.
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requires 180 days’ notice by either party.102 It can be amended at any
time by mutual written agreement.103 In either case, the cumbersome
legislative process of the United States Senate providing its advice and
consent could take even longer to ratify the new treaty or
amendments.104 As of 2018, seven treaty amendments were pending
in the United States Senate, the earliest introduced in 1983.105 The oil
companies who bear the financial risk want the procedure as clear as
possible to ensure they can see a return on their investment. The best
option is probably to utilize the broad, vague language in the treaty by
strengthening the Joint Commission into a body competent to establish
an efficient procedure and make good decisions.
To do this, the Joint Commission should establish one or more
subsidiary committees of experts to create the policy and procedure,
whose decisions will only become binding once ratified by the Joint
Commission. This way the Joint Commission can have the expertise
of more impartial industry experts rather than mere political
appointees but still maintain state sovereignty because the two Joint
Commission members would retain ultimate veto power.
From a geopolitical standpoint, the United States wants Mexico’s
offshore resources developed, mainly by IOC capital and expertise,
more than it cares about extracting rents in the transboundary
region.106 Because the Mexican Government gets 20% of its revenue
from oil production, it produces stability in the region to the benefit of
the United States the more Mexico’s oil reserves are efficiently
exploited.107 A productive Mexican oil and gas sector will contribute
to political and social stability because the government will be wellfunded and can maintain its extensive entitlement programs without
angering the powerful labor unions. Additionally, the energy sectors
of both countries are highly intertwined. In 2017, although the United
States imported more crude oil from Mexico than it exported to
Mexico, United States oil exports to Mexico accounted for over 50%
of Mexico’s gasoline use.108 It is thus in the interests of both countries,
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at art 23.
Id. at art 21.
U.S. CONST., art. II, § II, cl. II.
Treaties Pending in the Senate (updated as of July 17, 2019), U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/pending/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2019).
106. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 38, at 2.
107. Amy Stillman, Mexico’s Struggling State Oil Company Awaits New
President’s Risky Fix, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14, 2018, 6:01 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-14/a-cash-cow-on-its-last-legsmexican-oil-awaits-amlo-s-risky-fix.
108. U.S. Embassies, Mexico – Oil and Gas, INT’L TRADE ASS’N, DEPT. OF COM.
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one as a net importer and the other as a net exporter, to resolve disputes
in oil production promptly.109 The treaty is not especially helpful in
this case because specific procedure and terms have been left up to the
future Joint Commission to decide.110
Because difficulties can easily arise, both states are put in a position
to leverage an imbalance in the unitization agreement or production
terms near the three-mile area in the event of a dispute. Once an oil or
gas reserve is found, it takes about ten years before production
begins.111 Because standard practice is on such a long timeframe, IOCs
are hemorrhaging money during exploration and drilling and want
legal issues like unitization resolved with certain promptness.
Additionally, the transboundary region has the potential to quickly
become very politicized, as it has been in Mexico.112 These critical
political and financial concerns necessitate effective treaty
implementation so that unitization occurs smoothly and equitably.
However, the treaty’s vague terms only put an obligation on both
governments to attempt to negotiate, while leaving many of the
decisions to the Joint Commission. If negotiations for unitization fail,
the treaty implicitly allows both sides to continue production by only
stipulating non-binding mediation.113 In contrast to standard
international practice, the arbitration clause says nothing about
consent to arbitrate or the finality of the decision.114 Standard
international practice as used in the Iceland-Norway treaty and the
Timor Gap treaty is to explicitly state that disputes “shall be
submitted” to arbitration; that any award “shall be final and binding;”
and how arbitrators are chosen.115
Because the parties have not agreed that the arbitration will be
binding, either party could refuse to comply with an arbitrator’s
decision. Curiously, if the Joint Commission cannot agree to
mediation and expert determination, then the arbitration will be
conducted according to rules established by the Joint Commission.116
Thus, the parties already in disagreement will have to establish the
rules for resolving their disagreement while frustrated by the
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.export.gov/article?id=Mexico-Upstream-Oil-and-Gas.
109. Id.
110. 2012 Transboundary Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 17.
111. van Logchem, supra note 20, at 240.
112. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 38, at 9.
113. 2012 Transboundary Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 15 §3.
114. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 762.
115. Id. at 762–63.
116. 2012 Transboundary Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 17.
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disagreement. This dispute resolution clause could lead to competitive
drilling by explicitly allowing a licensee to produce oil in the event
negotiations fail.117 As discussed, competitive drilling in the face of a
dispute would likely conflict with international law.118
Arbitration could also be subject to legal challenge in both countries
and fail even if the treaty followed standard practice for international
transboundary treaties by specifying binding arbitration.119 In 2008,
the United States Supreme Court decided in Medellin v. Texas that
international treaties may be binding law for the federal government
but not enforceable in United States courts if Congress did not pass
“implementing legislation” to make ICJ decisions binding domestic
law.120 In Medellin, the United States lost a case at the ICJ against
Mexico for not informing Mexican nationals sentenced to death of
their right to contact a consulate under the Vienna treaty.121 The Court
declared Article 36 of the Vienna treaty not self-executing and said for
decisions from international arbitrators or tribunals to be effective,
Congress had to pass implementing legislation that explicitly stated
that decisions constitute binding domestic law.122 In light of constant
congressional gridlock, this is highly unlikely to happen.
Additionally, when the 2012 treaty was ratified, Mexico was
exempted from North American Free Trade Act (“NAFTA”) chapter
11, dealing with energy and international investment arbitration as the
legal regime barred foreign investment at the time.123 After Mexico’s
energy reforms it was unclear whether Mexico implicitly consented
to oil and gas disputes to NAFTA chapter 11 and Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”).124 NAFTA’s replacement treaty125
removes most ISDS mechanisms, with the exception of certain oil and
gas disputes between Mexico and the United States.126 Oil companies
117. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 786.
118. Id. at 701–02.
119. Id. at 765.
120. 552 U.S. 491, 504-05 (2008).
121. Id. at 497–98.
122. Id. at 504–05.
123. Bradley J. Condon, Mexican Energy Reform and NAFTA Chapter 11:
Articles 20 and 21 of the Hydrocarbons Law and Access to Investment Arbitration,
9 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS 203, 204 (2016).
124. See id. (arguing that Mexico is subject to NAFTA chapter 11 after the energy
reforms).
125. See infra SECTION IV.B.
126. Heather Long, The USMCA is finally done. Here’s what is in it., WASH. POST
(Dec.
10,
2019,
4:13
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/12/10/usmca-is-finally-done-dealafter-democrats-sign-off-heres-what-is-it/.
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lobbied for ISDS due to fear the Mexican Government would attempt
to nationalize the oil industry.127 ISDS for Oil and Gas against Mexico
generally does not allow claims regarding minimum standard of
treatment, indirect expropriation, or acquisition claims, and requires
exhaustion of local remedies, making a dispute unlikely to reach the
arbitrators.128 In reality, the new provisions for Oil and Gas dispute
resolutions reflect the broader trend of international law moving away
from international bodies in favor of States acting in more direct
national interest.129 Thus, even if the language in the treaty conformed
to standard international practice, a dispute against the United States
is subject to challenge under Medellin and faces an uncertain ISDS
regime against Mexico. Because the dispute resolution mechanism is
so uncertain, it is necessary to ensure the Joint Commission can make
decisions that neither side is likely to reject.
The Joint Commission’s structure in the treaty is not especially
robust.130 The Commission is made up of a representative from each
party but depends on the respective executive authorities for
funding.131 As the treaty grants the Joint Commission broad authority
to interpret and implement the treaty as they unitize a transboundary
reservoir, it needs more impartiality to reach agreements.132
One option would be to strengthen the Joint Commission by
structuring it more like the International Boundary Water Commission
(“IBWC”). 133 The Joint Commission’s structure is in stark contrast to
the IBWC, which operates as a bilateral international organization
with clear qualifications for its members. The IBWC is divided into
Executive, Operations, Engineering, and Administration departments,
while operating as independent and impartially as possible.134 The
IBWC began in 1889 to oversee transboundary groundwater resources
between the United States and Mexico according to rules agreed on in
the 1884 convention.135 As an entity dealing with treaty
127. Id.
128. Sergio Puig, Can International Trade Law Recover? The United StatesMexico-Canada Agreement: A Glimpse Into the Geoeconomic World Order, 113
AJIL UNBOUND 56, 57 (2019).
129. Id.
130. 2012 Transboundary Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 14.
131. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 761.
132. Id. at 761–62; 2012 Transboundary Treaty, supra note 45, at art. 14 §5.
133. See generally U.S. IBWC Organizational Structure, INT’L BOUNDARY &
WATER COMM’N, https://www.ibwc.gov/organization/organization.html (last
visited March 2, 2019).
134. Id.; Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 761.
135. See Convention between the United States and Mexico Water Boundary,
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implementation over fugitive transboundary resources between the
United States and Mexico for over a century, though it deals in a
different field of law, some of the institutional knowledge gained from
the IBWC could empower the Joint Commission in its mission.
The Joint Commission can be strengthened by the two executive
representatives making appointments to subsidiary committees like
the IBWC departments, which would craft the necessary procedure
and policy. Generally, the Joint Commission could give deference to
committee decisions because of their expertise but the Joint
Commission would retain veto power via their power granted in the
treaty. State sovereignty would be preserved because the Joint
Commission would ultimately ratify a committee decision for it to
become binding, but the committees would be better at creating the
policies than the Joint Commission.
Some of the knowledge the IBWC has of dealing with a fugitive
resource across borders is not relevant because the law treats water
differently than minerals like hydrocarbons.136 Thus, rather than
merely borrowing members from the IBWC, respective executive
agencies need to pick some committee members with expertise in the
international oil and gas industry. To balance the industry concerns,
members should also be impartial, as both governments want the
resources shared equitably. The IBWC has a history of equitably and
successfully negotiating the sharing of fugitive resources between
Mexico and the United States.137
Though the IWBC lacks hydrocarbon industry expertise, its
analogous expertise merits its involvement. Because the treaty leaves
so much up to the Joint Commission to decide, the Joint Commission
would be more effective and independent if the subsidiary committees
are drawn from entities like the IWBC, arbitrators, and international
law experts.138 According to the treaty, no committee decision could
become law until the Joint Commission approves it. This delegation
of authority makes their decisions less politicized, while the expertise
Extending the Duration of the Convention of March 1, 1889, U.S.-Mex., Mar. 1,
1889, T.S. No. 241, https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/TREATY_OF_1889.pdf.
136. For a discussion of the application of international groundwater law to
international disputes and international organizations, see Gabriel
Eckstein, Application of International Water Law to Transboundary Groundwater
Resources, and the Slovak-Hungarian Dispute over Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, 19
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 67 (1995).
137. See Stephen P. Mumme, Scarcity and Power in US-Mexico Transboundary
Water Governance: Has the Architecture Changed since NAFTA?, 13
GLOBALIZATIONS 702 (2016).
138. Id.
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involved makes it more likely good and equitable decisions are
reached, making it less likely parties to the unitization agreement opt
for arbitration at all.
Ideally, such a unitization agreement should be similar to a
production-sharing agreement.139 However, production-sharing
contracts work because the parties negotiate the terms before
production begins. Though production-sharing agreements typically
have set times to re-adjust the terms as more accurate seismic data is
uncovered, the dynamics do not apply quite the same way in
unitization. For an IOC that has spent ten years and several hundred
million dollars establishing an ultra-deepwater well, the political risk
of drilling close to maritime borders with a disputed legal framework
may deter investment. If IOCs thought that exploration too close to the
border could potentially result in an unfair production sharing
agreement being forced on them after beginning production, it could
potentially halt exploration in the area because the risk is too great.
Ultimately, it is in the interest of both nations to formalize
cooperation mechanisms so that common safety, infrastructure, and
environmental standards can develop as licensees discover more
offshore oil fields in the GOM.140 This goal is related to the United
States’ greater geopolitical concerns of keeping Mexico’s energy
reform alive by bringing stability so that IOCs can invest in the
country, and PEMEX can gain expertise and technology by working
with them. Though Mexican stability is a key concern, the United
States also sees domestic offshore oil production as a benefit for
energy security and thus wants to encourage investment in the
region.141 In recent years, developed nations have opted to move away
from international bodies in legal adjudication in favor of national
discretion.142 A state that submits itself to an international body cedes
some amount of sovereignty, and economic powerhouses like the
United States are inevitably less likely to concede to international
bodies. Strengthening the Joint Commission by creating specialized
committees to create unitization policies and fill in the gaps for the
Joint Commission to approve provides the best chance that the treaty

139. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 38, at 10.
140. Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez, Mexico’s Energy Reform and the 2012 USMexico Transboundary Agreement. An opportunity for Efficient, Effective and Safe
Exploitation of the Gulf of Mexico, 9 SEA GRANT L. & POLICY J. 1, 4 (2018).
141. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 38, at 10.
142. Puig, supra note 129.
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succeeds by minimizing the risk of dispute resolution derailing the
negotiations.
B. AMLO, USMCA, & Geopolitics
The Mexican administration, which pushed through the liberalizing
constitutional reforms in the energy sector, hoped that incorporating
the reforms into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) would make
Mexico’s energy sector permanently open to foreign investment.143
The election of Donald Trump meant that the United States would not
join the TPP, which weakened Mexico’s plan, but another election has
jeopardized the reforms.144 The 2018 election of Andrés Manuel
López Obrador (“AMLO”) will likely complicate implementing the
2012 treaty and could potentially turn a dispute in the boundary area
into international contention. AMLO, a staunch opponent of the 2014
reforms who the media has dubbed as the “Mexican, left-wing Donald
Trump,” has vowed to undo the privatization of Mexico’s hydrocarbon
industry.145 AMLO is no friend to industry investors and in 1992, even
led environmental protests against PEMEX.146 Because of the
ambiguity of the treaty, and the politicization of transboundary
reservoirs in Mexican politics, AMLO could conceivably claim the
United States has violated the terms of the treaty, causing an
international incident.147
The AMLO administration quickly showed a willingness to adhere
to radical campaign promises by halting construction of a partiallyconstructed $13 billion airport.148 In a shock to hydrocarbon investors,
143. Camilo Soto Crespo, A Mexican Outlook on NAFTA, TPP and their
Renegotiation: Investment Arbitration’s Transparency and International
Supervision at Peril?, 40 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 938, 983. (2018).
144. Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s
Signature
Trade
Deal,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
23,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-tradenafta.html?module=inline.
145. Nacha Cattan, et. al, AMLO Wins Big and All Eyes Turn to Battle for
Mexico’s
Congress,
BLOOMBERG
(July
1,
2018,
6:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-01/mexico-heads-to-pollswith-leftist-on-brink-of-historic-victory.
146. Armando Guzman & Rosalia Vegara, AMLO: Vocacion de Resistencia,
PROCESO (Mar. 30, 2012), https://www.proceso.com.mx/302704/amlo-vocacionde-resistencia.
147. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 38, at 12.
148. Aileen Cho, $13B Mexico City Airport Project Apparently Axed by
President-Elect,
ENGINEERING
NEWS
REC.
(Nov.
7,
2018),
https://www.enr.com/articles/45812-13b-mexico-city-airport-project-apparentlyaxed-by-president-elect.
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before his inauguration, his administration announced they would
review all exploration and production contracts awarded to private
companies after the energy reforms “for signs of corruption.”149 About
two weeks later, AMLO called the executives of companies awarded
contracts and informed them Mexico would honor their contracts if
the oil companies could “meet existing terms” and indicated his
administration would address regulatory bottlenecks but would still
review the contracts.150 A month later, AMLO announced he would
suspend future planned bidding rounds until the 107 awarded contracts
started producing oil.151
AMLO then somewhat ominously told investors, “we expect
results” and unveiled an ambitious goal of increasing Mexico’s oil
output and investing $3.9 billion in PEMEX’s exploration and
production.152 He subsequently offered a three-year “truce” to
companies who previously won bidding rounds.153 This was in his first
few months in office, and the administration is also fulfilling AMLO’s
vow to fight fuel theft by shutting down key pipelines and reducing
United States oil imports.154 These early events show that AMLO may
not follow through with his rhetoric but is willing to make decisions
that are not economically viable because of his commitment to
Mexico’s sovereignty over hydrocarbon resources, and what he feels
149. Mexico’s AMLO Starts Oil Contract Reviews to Tackle Corruption, TELESUR
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Mexicos-AMLO-Starts-OilContract-Reviews-to-Tackle-Corruption-20180918-0021.html.
150. Adriana Barrera, Mexico’s next president will honor existing oil contracts –
official,
REUTERS
(Sept.
27,
2018,
5:35
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/mexico-oil/mexicos-next-president-will-honorexisting-oil-contracts-official-idUSL2N1WD1TQ.
151. Andrew Baker, AMLO to Suspend Mexico Bid Rounds Until Current
Projects Start Producing, NATURAL GAS INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/116170-amlo-to-suspend-mexico-bidrounds-until-current-projects-start-producing.
152. Andrew Baker, Mexico E&P Auctions to be Suspended Until Current
Projects Start Producing, President-Elect Says, NATURAL GAS INTELLIGENCE (Oct.
23, 2018), https://www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/116214-mexico-ep-auctionsto-be-suspended-until-current-projects-start-producing-president-elect-says;
Bloomberg, AMLO targets $3.9 billion in new Mexico oil investment, JWN ENERGY
(Sept. 11, 2018, 7:08 AM), https://www.jwnenergy.com/article/2018/9/amlotargets-39-billion-new-mexico-oil-investment/.
153. Andrew Baker, AMLO Offers Three-Year ‘Truce’ to Oil, Gas Bid Round
Winners,
NATURAL
GAS
INTELLIGENCE
(Dec.
7,
2018),
https://www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/116712-amlo-offers-three-year-truce-tooil-gas-bid-round-winners.
154. Robbie Whelan & Rebecca Elliott, Mexico Reduces U.S. Gasoline Imports,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 2019 6:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mexicoreduces-u-s-gasoline-imports-11547249440.
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is best for his people. AMLO could potentially complicate a
transboundary negotiation by public rhetoric alone.
Before his election, some scholars hoped that the NAFTA
renegotiations would help president Peña Nieto’s energy reforms
apply more permanently.155 The Trump Administration’s
renegotiation of NAFTA (United States, Mexico, and Canada
Agreement “USMCA”) complicates the energy relations between
Mexico and the United States. When the United States and Mexico
drafted the 2012 treaty, Mexico had reservations from NAFTA’s
dispute resolution chapter regarding oil and gas to preserve the
PEMEX monopoly.156 USMCA was signed into law by President
Trump on January 29, 2020.157 Under USMCA, Mexico’s oil and gas
sector is subject to ISDS for disputes against the United States in
limited situations, excluding indirect expropriation, establishment and
acquisition claims, and only after local remedies are exhausted.158
The 2012 treaty does not eliminate either party’s rights in other
treaties.159 Thus, USMCA’s dispute resolution provisions apply to a
confirmed transboundary reservoir in the treaty region.160 The
governmental actions over a transboundary reservoir within the scope
of USMCA’s dispute resolutions are limited, to the chagrin of
investors.161 Contracts Mexico awards to foreign investors can only be
submitted to ISDS for direct expropriation, violation of national
treatment, and violation of the Most Favored Nation provision, and
only after local remedies are exhausted.162 Additionally, national
treatment claims regarding establishment or acquisition of an
investment are expressly excluded.163 These sectorial limits to ISDS
against Mexico were criticized by experts who were otherwise pleased
155. Crespo, supra note 143, at 977–78.
156. Condon, supra note 124, at 206.
157. President Donald J. Trump’s United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
Delivers a Historic Win for American Workers, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 29, 2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumpsunited-states-mexico-canada-agreement-delivers-historic-win-american-workers/.
158. See United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Ch. 14
Annex E, Ch. 31, Nov. 30, 2018, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between;
Puig,
supra note 129.
159. 2012 Transboundary Treaty, supra note 45, at art 25.
160. Id.; see also Condon, supra note 124, at 206 (discussing the likely application
of NAFTA chapter 11 after the 2014 reforms).
161. Zara Shafruddin, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed
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with USMCA for failing to support the United States’ energy interests
sufficiently.164 Because the 2012 treaty does not eliminate any
USMCA rules, the non-binding arbitration provided in the 2012 treaty
remains an additional remedy for a dispute in the transboundary
region. Arbitration under the 2012 treaty may now be more likely to
be utilized in the event of a dispute because the options under USMCA
are so limited, but its application is also likely to be contested.
USMCA adds an annex to the investor arbitration provision that
adds a specific structure to disputes in the energy sector because of the
presence of PEMEX.165 Annex 14-E creates a neutral forum for
licensees to resolve disputes about transactions that a unitization
agreement may fall under, but investors receive less protection from
expropriation.166 Generally, USMCA provides investors less
protection than NAFTA, but USMCA makes it more evident than
NAFTA that investors in the energy sector can have remedies under
the treaty.167 These challenges posed by USMCA’s dispute resolution
provisions make it even more important that the Joint Commission has
enough expertise that it can anticipate and prevent any disputes before
triggering a dispute resolution procedure.
The infamous “Sunset Clause” in USMCA adds to the uncertainty
investors in the transboundary region face.168 The Sunset Clause was
hotly contested, criticized, and praised during the USMCA
negotiations.169 The Sunset Clause provides that USMCA will
terminate 16 years after entry, but every six years a commission will
review USMCA for potential changes, and must affirm each party’s
164. Addendum, Letter to Ambassador Lighthizer from Industry Trade Advisory
Committee on Energy and Energy Services (Oct. 25, 2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/AdvisoryCommitteeReport
s/ITAC_6_REPORT-Energy_and_Energy_Services_Addendum.pdf.
165. Martin J. Valasek, Alison G. FitzGerald & Jenna Anne de Jong, Major
changes for investor-state dispute settlement in new United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement,
NORTON
ROSE
FULBRIGHT
(Oct.
2018),
https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/91d41adf/majorchanges-for-investor-state-dispute-settlement-in-new-united-states-mexico-canadaagreement.
166. Id.
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(July
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2019),
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Different
from
NAFTA?
FINANCIAL
TIMES
(Oct.
1,
2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/92e9ce0a-c55f-11e8-bc21-54264d1c4647.

546

TEXAS A&M J. OF PROP. L.

[Vol. 6

desire to extend USMCA for another 16 years, or USMCA will
terminate upon expiration of the 16 year term.170 Interestingly,
USMCA also allows a party to withdraw as long as they provide a 6
month notice, adding to the uncertainty.171 The Industry Trade
Advisory Committee on Energy and Energy Services opposed the
clause specifically because it could harm the energy sector’s
necessarily long-term investments.172 As offshore oil and gas projects
operate on a long timeline, USMCA could potentially go out of effect
by failing to be re-approved between an IOC winning a lease and
going into production. This would leave the dispute resolution regime
totally uncertain, and clearly deters IOC investment in the
transboundary region specifically, and in Mexico generally.
USMCA specifies Mexico’s sovereign ownership of hydrocarbons
in a stand-alone chapter titled, “The Mexican State’s Direct,
Inalienable, and Imprescriptible Ownership of Hydrocarbons.”173 It
also specifies that Mexico has a right to reform its domestic law, even
though the point has never been disputed.174 The chapter specifies the
Mexican state’s ownership of all hydrocarbons in the continental shelf
and EEZ “in strata or deposits, regardless of their physical
conditions.”175 This statement does not state anything new about
Mexico’s hydrocarbon law or state anything inconsistent with
international law. Although chapter 8 uses more forceful language, it
essentially restates what the United States and Mexico acknowledged
in the 2012 treaty.
Because AMLO’s administration unlikely has the capacity to roll
back Mexico’s energy reforms as promised, chapter 8 of USMCA
seems mostly symbolic. AMLO’s administration can halt the bidding
process and renegotiate a few contracts, or if he finds it politically
expedient, he can allow all private contracts already negotiated to
remain. Keeping the existing contracts and not allowing any more
170. USMCA
art.
34.7,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/34_Final_Pr
ovisions.pdf.
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Sept.
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2018,
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tion_of_Mexican_Ownership_of_Hydrocarbons.pdf.
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would have the benefit of allowing PEMEX to gain expertise, an
expanding market, and exploration data from the existing contracts
while appearing to roll back reforms by merely halting any new
contracts. The downside is this will slow the development of the
Mexican energy sector because they will not have as much IOC
investment. The concerns in both the United States and Mexico reflect
how China’s trade practices have made national security a larger
concern in all trade agreements, with the result of undermining
international accountability to global bodies.176
USMCA also seems to have been written with an eye to limit
Chinese economic ties with North America by giving each nation veto
power over free-trade deals.177 In the context of the Trump
administration’s “trade war” with China, some experts have claimed
that USMCA strengthened the United States’ position negotiating
tariffs with China.178 AMLO’s administration is leveraging the
tensions between the United States and China by calling for a
“Marshall Plan” investment in Central America—and threatening to
get help from Chinese investors if the United States is not on board.179
The United States is clearly concerned about growing Chinese
influence because their state-directed economy has been able to
disrupt global trade flows in their favor.180 USMCA Article 32.10
requires any party to the treaty negotiating with a non-market
economy (such as China) to notify the other parties of their
relationship, provide the parties the opportunity to review any
agreements they reach, keep them generally informed, and determine
if USMCA will apply to the country with a non-market economy.181
This provision is unlikely to prevent Mexico from doing business with
Chinese enterprises, but signals that the United States will scrutinize
176. Puig, supra note 129, at 59–60.
177. Lee Jeong-ho, et. al., China ‘Threatened with Isolation’ by Veto Written into
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any agreement and potentially leverage its position if it sees an
operation as a threat.182
Additionally, CNOOC—owned by the Chinese government—has
spent recent years investing in offshore oil blocks on both sides of the
GOM.183 Experts believe that CNOOC is investing on both sides of
the transboundary region so that it can apply the same principles it
learns during unitization negotiations to offshore resources in
contested regions of the South China Sea.184 The Chinese government
will also likely apply what it learns during the unitization negotiations
as another tool in consolidating its Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”) to
integrate Eurasian economies under a Chinese-led anti-democratic
economic system.185 A defining feature of the BRI is maximizing
flexibility in international law and treaties to favor Chinese
ventures.186 The 2012 treaty, because of it’s vague terms, provides a
key learning opportunity for the application of flexibility in
international law. Thus, the implications of any decisions the Joint
Commission comes to will have considerable influence in coming
geopolitical realignments as power projection supplants the regime of
international legal bodies established in the 20th century.
V. CONCLUSION
The 2012 transboundary treaty was negotiated with a different legal
regime and geopolitical framework in mind. Mexico’s state-owned
venture, PEMEX, was in severe crisis, but free trade agreements like
the TPP promised to solve some of its problems while maintaining the
national monopoly. Though leaders of both countries foresaw
Mexico’s energy sector liberalizing, the treaty was designed for a time
when there was no IOC exploration in Mexico. Thus, some of the
treaty’s shortcomings are due to changed circumstances. Going
forward, policymakers must consider a legal framework that creates
stability so that the rich subsoil hydrocarbons of the GOM are
182. Id.
183. For a short history of Chinese investment in the Gulf of Mexico, see
Guillermo Garcia-Sanchez, The Footprint of the Chinese Petro-Dragon: The Future
of Investment Law in Transboundary Resources, 94 TULANE L. REV. (forthcoming
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184. Id. at 50.
185. Ash Milton, China’s Belt and Road Plan to Reshape the International Order,
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developed efficiently and equitably. This consideration is more vital
considering that great power competition is leading States to move
away from the oversight of international bodies out of national security
concerns.
Ultimately, the treaty’s shortcomings would be minimized by an
effort to make the Joint Commission more experienced and thus better
equipped to negotiate a unitization agreement. Subsidiary committees
like the IWBC departments, comprised of members with expertise in
maritime boundary disputes, would strengthen the Joint Commission.
The Joint Commission can use its existing treaty powers to appoint one
or several subsidiary committees to create unitization policy, dispute
resolution procedure, set environmental standards, and interpret
seismic data. The Joint Commission can increase the expertise and
impartiality of the committees by appointing experts in international
oil and gas arbitration who have excellent industry knowledge; IBWC
members; and respected experts in international law. Expert
committees could alleviate the vague environmental and safety
standards by creating something more concrete for the Joint
Commission to implement that benefits all parties. The committees
could also lessen the effect of the treaty’s unclear dispute resolution
clause, while avoiding a lengthy treaty amendment or renegotiation.
Because no committee policy is binding without the Joint
Commission’s approval, the two Joint Commission members would
have a veto that maintains state sovereignty but is more likely to
produce effective policies.
Both the United States and Mexico desire to develop offshore oil as
safely and efficiently as possible. The 2012 treaty left open the
possibility that a light Rule of Capture could be applied if unitization
negotiations failed, even though this would likely be contrary to
international law. Though not directly in conflict, the interests of the
United States, Mexico, and potential IOC licensees are not aligned, so
great care is needed to craft a unitization agreement. While allowing a
licensee to continue production by putting profits in escrow may be the
best option, it may not benefit investors who lose opportunity costs and
cash flow while the profit remains in escrow. Because of Medellin and
Mexico’s USMCA’s limited ISDS provisions, investor disputes could
be subject to legal challenges in both countries. USMCA’s sunset
provision creates more uncertainty for investors. If the Joint
Commission has the resources to make the best decisions, it will
prevent disputes from arising and entering this arena of legal
uncertainty surrounding the dispute resolution provisions.
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Most importantly, the Joint Commission delegating its authority to
committees can depoliticize much of the decision-making process
without undermining executive prerogatives in the treaty. As the world
goes through geopolitical realignment and global financial difficulty,
Chinese NOC investment in Mexico’s offshore oil may provoke a less
equitable United States reaction during negotiations. Frosty relations
between the United States and China may mean that geopolitical
concerns take precedence over economic and energy security concerns.
The way the United States and Mexico apply the 2012 treaty will have
a direct effect in contested areas around the world, like the South China
Sea. Thus, it is imperative that the United States and Mexico behave as
good neighbors so they can exploit ocean resources that until recently
were considered the property of all humanity by virtue of natural law.

